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Santistevan and Buchanan: Criminal Law & Procedure

CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE

u.s.

v. LA YTON: EXTENDING
PROSECUTORIAL BOUNDARIES LIMITING
SIXTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Lay ton, 1 the Ninth Circuit ruled that
hearsay statements which qualified under the declarations
against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, were admissible when offered to inculpate the defendant in criminal activity.2 The court also instructed the lower court that if on remand
there was a "reasonable inference" of the existence of a criminal
conspiracy to which defendant and declarant were party, additional hearsay statements were to be admitted as those made in
furtherance of that conspiracy. 3
All of the statements were held admissible notwithstanding.
the fact that the declarant's unavailability' precluded confrontation of the witness which is guaranteed by the sixth amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. Ii The court also concluded it was not an
abuse of the trial court's discretion6 to rule on the government's
motion seeking admission of the statements prior to the retrial7
1. 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Wallace J.; the other panel members were Kennedy and Nelson, J.J.), cert. denied, _U.S._, 104 S.Ct. 1423 (1984).
2. [d. at 560.
3. [d. at 557-58.
4. The declarant, Jim Jones, killed himself as part of a mass suicide which followed
the events outlined below. [d. at 561.
5. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him ... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. The test applied in United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1976), suggests the trial court should reach its decision by balancing a desire to preserve the government's right to appeal with the inefficiencies created by conducting a mini-trial. [d. at
626.
7. It is important to point out that the lower court judge heard the motion prior to
the retrial of the defendant because he had already heard the evidence at the first trial.
U.S. v. Layton, 549 F.Supp. 903, 908 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The trial judge was quick to cau-
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of the defendant, and noted that jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion was available8 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3731. 9
Defendant, Larry Layton, was indicted for conspiracy to
murder a Congressman and other related counts 10 in connection
with the shooting death of U.S. Congressman l l Leo Ryan at the
Jonestown religious encampment, located in the Republic of
Guyana. 12 Critical to implicating the defendant in the alleged
conspiracy to kill Ryan 1S were three sets of statements 14 made
tion that by ruling on the motion before the second trial he did not intend to encourage
the government to routinely file and appeal pretrial evidentiary motions in criminal
cases. [d. at 908. See also, United States v. Barletta, 644 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1981).
8. 720 F.2d at 554 (1971).
9. 18 U.S.C. §3731 states in pertinent part:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision ... suppressing or excluding evidence
... not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy
and before the verdict or finding on an indictment ... if the
United States attorney certifies .. the appeal is not taken for
purposes of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof
of a fact material in the proceeding.
The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty
days after the decision ... has been rendered ....
(emphasis added).
10. Layton was charged with conspiracy to murder a Congressman, aiding and abetting the murder of a Congressman, conspiracy to murder an internationally protected
person (Richard Dwyer, the Deputy Chief of Mission for the United States in the Republic of Guyana), and aiding and abetting the attempted murder of an internationally protected person. 720 F.2d at 551.
11. Congressman Ryan was on an official investigation into allegations that U.S. citizens at the encampment were living in substandard conditions and being detained
against their will. [d. at 551.
12. Jonestown was located in a secluded area in the jungles of the Republic of
Guyana and was part of a religious organization known as the People's Temple, the settlement having approximately 1,200 residents. [d. at 551.
13. Accompanied by a number of Jonestown inhabitants who had elected to defect
from the camp, Ryan and members of his party were ambushed as they prepared to
return to the United States. [d. at 552. The government alleged a conspiracy to murder
Ryan had arisen prior to his arrival at Jonestown and that the defendant had feigned
defection as part of an agreement to kill him and the defectors who had chosen to return
with him. [d. at 554-55.
14. The first set of statements which the government believes indicate the conspiracy to kill Ryan was already in existence include tape recordings of speeches made by
Jones prior to Ryan's arrival which were broadcast over loudspeakers throughout the
camp. They indicated that Jones was hostile and concerned about Ryan's investigation,
urged residents not to talk to Ryan and his delegation, and intimated harm might befall
the Congressman. [d. at 551. In another recording Jones expressed his desire to "shoot
someone ... like him." [d. at 555.
The second set of statements made by Jones to his attorney indicate he had knowledge of the events about to take place at the airstrip and according to the court, tend to
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by Jim Jones, the leaderlll of the People's Temple Movement, of
which the defendant was a member.16
The district court held that some of the statements were
inadmissible hearsay1? and did not qualify as hearsay exceptions.
The court excluded the other qualifying statements because it
believed their admission would violate the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witness. 18 The government did not
immediately appeal the rulings excluding the statements. However, when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on
any of the four counts at trial,19 the government filed a separate
pretrial motion to admit the same statements prior to the second trial. The district court judge denied the motion 20 and the
government appealed.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Appellate Jurisdiction
In United States u. Wilson,21 the Supreme Court stated the
implicate Jones in those events. [d. at 560. Significantly, the statements also indicate
that Layton was not a defector but had taken all of the weapons from the camp and was
going to the airstrip to engage in violent acts. [d. at 558.
The third set of statements were from another recorded broadcast known as the
"Last Hour Tape." The speech was made before and during the mass suicide which took
place at Jonestown. Before taking his own life, Jones indicated that one of the people
escorting Ryan to the nearby airstrip was going to shoot the pilot. [d. at 561-62. Upon
receiving word of the deaths at the airstrip, Jones stated in part: "The congressman's
dead ... many of our traitors are dead ... I didn't but my people did .... I don't
know who fired the shot, I don't know who killed the Congressman. But as far as I'm
concerned, I killed him." [d. at 562. In addition to the remarks made by Jones to his
attorney, these statements were offered by the government as declarations against Jones'
penal interest. [d. at 560.
A fourth statement made by another People's Temple member was found to be
inadmissible by the trial court and the ruling was affirmed on appeal. [d. at 563.
15. The court observed that Jones exerted enormous influence over the People's
Temple members and characterized the pre-arrival speeches as "[t)he rallying cries of a
charismatic leader to his devoted followers." [d. at 557.
16. Defendant had been in the People's Temple security force in the United States
and was alleged to be close to the hierarchy of the Movement. [d. at 551.
17. 549 F.Supp. at 908.
18. [d. at 918.
19. [d. at 907.
20. [d. at 922.
21. 420 U.S. 332 (1975). In Wilson, the Government sought review of the trial
court's decision to dismiss an indictment after a jury had returned a guilty verdict. The
Court characterized the judges action as'a "postverdict ruling of law" which would not
result in the retrial of the defendant, and allowed the Government to appeal the ruling.
[d. at 352-53.
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purpose of 18 U.S.C. §3731 was to remove all statutory barriers
to government appeals and to allow them whenever the Constitution would permit. 11 The Court outlined the necessary requirements for an appeal pursuant to the statute in United States u.
Helstoski.1 8 The Court stated the requisites of the statute permitted an appeal if: (1) there was a district court order excluding the evidence; (2) the United States attorney filed the proper
certification; and, (3) the appeal was taken within 30 days.24 Additionally, the statute prohibits appeals made after a defendant
has been placed in jeopardy, but that provisions is likely inapplicable where a mistrial is declared due to a hung jury.211
The Ninth Circuit has followed Helstoski and Wilson in decisions where appellate review has been in issue. For example, in
United States u. Loud Hawk,16 the government appealed an order dismissing a grand jury indictment. The indictment had
been dismissed because delay in bringing the defendants to trial
had resulted from the government's appeal under section 3731 of
a suppression order.17 The court reversed, finding the delay was
necessary to permit the meaningful exercise of appellate review
pursuant to the statute. 18
22. ld. at 337. The fifth amendment's prohibition that "[n)o person ... shall be
... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... ", U.S.
CONST. amend. V., appears to be the clearest limitation to appeals under the statute. The
dissent in Wilson pointed to sixth amendment speedy trial concerns which might also
prevent review under section 3731. 420 U.S. at 357.
23. 442 U.S. 477 (1979). The Court ruled the Government was authorized to appeal
from an order prohibiting the introduction of a legislator's past legislative acts. Id. at 487
n.6.
24.ld.
25. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). The defendant was retried after a mistrial was declared at the first trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. The Court reiterated the holding in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (1824), that a second trial
is permitted when it is a 'manifest necessity', the most common form arising when a jury
is unable to reach a verdict. ld. at 672.
26. 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1980). Defendants
were charged with the unlawful possession of destructive devices (dynamite) and unlawful transportation of weapons between state lines. ld. at 1143. The weapons counts were
dismissed because they were not considered to be a substantial proof of a fact material to
the proceeding, therefore not meeting the requirements of section 3731. ld. at 1150.
27. ld. at 1149.
28. ld. at 1150. The court found the other provisions of the statute had also been
satisfied since the defendants had not been placed in double jeopardy and the suppressed evidence was critical in establishing a necessary element of the alleged offenses.
ld.
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In United States v. Hetrick,29 the court expanded the scope
of review under the statute when it permitted the government to
appeal a court order reducing a defendant's jail sentence. Relying on Wilson, the court rejected the notion that the government
was restricted to the specific categories mentioned in the statute. 80 Similarly, the court in United States v. Humphries,sl permitted an appeal which was not within the express language of
the statute. 82 However, in United States v. Booth,88 the court
discussed the issue of whether appellate review of a motion to
admit evidence was available under section 3731. The court concluded that the statute gives the government the right to appeal
only the suppression or exclusion of evidence, and not its
admission. 84
B.

Statements Made in Furtherance of a Conspiracy.
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence811 governs the admission of coconspirator statements against an accused. Three requirements must be met in order for a statement
to be admissible as that of a co-conspirator. The prosecution
must: (1) show that the declarations were made during the
course of the conspiracy; (2) show they were made in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) present evidence of independent
proof of the conspiracy and the connection of the declarant and
defendant to it.8s In addition, it must be demonstrated that admission of the coconspirators' declarations are not violative of
the confrontation clause of the Constitution. 87
29. 644 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1980). The court ordered that the defendant's sentence be
reduced from ten to five years, and then some months later reduced the sentence to
three years. Id. at 753-54.
30. Id. at 755.
31. 636 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1980) (appeal from denial of motion to determine the
admissibility of evidence was held appropriate under the statute).
32. Humphries argued the appeal was not properly before the court as the motion
previously denied was one to determine the admissibility of evidence rather than its exclusion. I d. at 1175. The court rejected the argument, focusing on the effect of the order,
which did not elaborate on the particulars of its scope requiring the government to seek
clarification of the order. I d. at 1175-77.
33. 669 F.2d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981) (government's challenge to admitted testimony of an expert witness determined' not to be subject to review under the statute).
34.Id.
35. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
36. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states in part: "A statement is not hearsay if... (2) (tJhe
statement is offered against a party and is .. (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
37. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
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In Krulewitch u. United States,38 the Supreme Court stated
that to be admissible, hearsay statements made by one conspirator and offered against another must be made in furtherance of
the conspiracy charged. The Court refused to admit the statement of a coconspirator made after her arrest because it was not
made in furtherance of the conspiracy, rather the Court determined the statement was made for purposes of concealing the
crime and protecting one of the participants. 39 Likewise in Dutton u. Euans,40 the Court stated that in federal conspiracy trials
the hearsay exception that allows evidence of an out-of-court
statement of one conspirator to be admitted against his fellow
conspirator is applicable only if the statement was made in the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.4!
In United States u. Eubanks,u the Ninth Circuit followed
the "in furtherance" requirement set forth in Krulewitch using
somewhat different terms. The court stated that in order for a
declaration to be admissible under the coconspirator exception
to the hearsay rule, it must further the common objectives of the
conspiracy.4S Similarly, in United States u. Mason," the court
held that a statement reassuring a buyer that a drug transaction
would occur, which was made to prevent him from withdrawing
from the planned sale, was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.411 Finally, in United States u. Sears,48 the court indicated
statements made to ensure a successful escape after a robbery
38. 336 U.S. 440 (1949). The position of the Court is consistent with the requirement of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) that the statement be made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
39. 336 U.S. at 443-44.
40. 400 U.S. 74, 83 (1970). A Georgia statute allowed for the admission of an out-of- '
court hearsay statement made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy; declarant's statement that had it not been for defendant, "we wouldn't be in this now," was
held admissible by the Court.
41. ld. at 81.
42. 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1979). Statements which were made instructing a
conspirator to "clean up" in order to distribute heroin were found to have furthered the
objectives of the conspiracy to distribute heroin.
43. ld. at 520. The court found that one of the statements at issue in Eubanks did'
not induce the party hearing the statement to join the conspiracy and was nothing more
than a casual admission of CUlpability to someone the declarant had decided to trust. ld.
See also, United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975) (nothing in statement
indicating the declarant was seeking to induce the listener to deal with the conspirators);
United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.. 1980) (statement "we are fixing to kill a
Mexican" nothing more than a casual admission).
44. 658 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 1270.
46. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1981).
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was committed, could be in furtherance of a conspiracy!7 The
court admitted into evidence a statement to dissuade an acquaintance of the accused from calling the police since the statement was necessary to ensure a successful escape. 48
The third requirement, that independent evidence connecting the defendant and the declarant to the conspiracy must be
established was followed by the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Perez. 49 In Perez, the defendant had made a number of admissions which were considered separate and apart from the
coconspirator exception. There was also evidence of meetings in
which the defendant took part to exchange cocaine and further
evidence of the actual exchange of, and payment for, the cocaine. llo The court stated this was sufficient to satisfy the third
prong of the co-conspirator test and concluded the prosecution
had established a prima facie case through the introduction of
substantial evidence other than the contested hearsay. III This
holding is consistent with the court's earlier holding in United
States v. Rosales. llz

C. Declarations Against Penal Interest
The requirements of Rule B04(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence must be met before evidence is admissible as a declaration against penal interest: (1) the declarant must be unavailable; (2) the statement must tend to subject the declarant to
criminal liability such that a reasonable person in the declar47. [d. at 905.
48. [d. Other Ninth Circuit decisions have admitted statements which set an ongo-

ing conspiracy in motion or persuade the listener to act in a fashion which.would facilitate its completion as being in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, United States v.
Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1977) (statement to party to secure mixing bowls to mix
drugs in furtherance of the conspiracy to sell drugs); United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d
1069 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978). (statement made to induce continued participation or to allay fears of a coconspirator are in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
49. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
50. [d. at 659.
51. [d.

52. 584 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1978) (fact that defendant had actually supplied cocaine
with the intent that it reach the undercover buyer raises reasonable inference he actively
participated in the conspiracy); See also, United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir.
1977) (evidence independent of the proffered statements must be shown); U.S. v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1975) (otherwise innocent act when viewed in the context of
the surrounding circumstances, justifies an inference of complicity).
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ant's position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true, and (3) there must be corroborating circumstances which indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. liS
Statements which tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability which exculpating the accused must clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement. 1I4
In Dutton v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
statement made by the declarant inculpating the accused could
be admitted against him. The plurality opinion stated there was
an "indicia of reliability" which warranted the admission of the
inculpative statement. 1I1I The statement in Dutton was characterized by the Court as not being crucial or devastating in light of
the significant amount of additional testimony presented by the
prosecution. lie
Although the Ninth Circuit has applied Rule 801(b)(3) in
cases where hearsay statements were offered to exculpate the accused,1I7 the court has never been faced with the question of its
application where the statements were offered to inculpate the
53. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). A provision of the rule makes it clear that there must be
sufficient corroboration when a statement is offered to exculpate the accused. No similar
provision for inculpative statements was included by the drafters of the Federal Rules
and according to one commentator, the first two published drafts of Rule 804(b)(3) contained a sentence which excluded inculpatory statements from the rule. 4 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1I804(b)(3)[03) at 804·110 (1984).
54. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) specifies in relevant part: "A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement." (Emphasis added).
55. 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). The statement, that had it not been for the defendant
(Evans) "we wouldn't be in this now," was made by a co-defendant (Williams) in response to a question posed by a fellow prisoner (Shaw) regarding the outcome of Williams' arraignment. Williams did not testify, nor was he called as a witness. Shaw testified that Williams made the statement which was subsequently admitted against Evans.
Id. The statement had qualified as that of a coconspirator under Georgia law. Id. at 78.
The Court indicated it was also against Williams' penal interest to make the statement.
Id. at 89. The concurring opinion believed the admission of the statement was harmless
error based on the entire record. Id at 90.
56. Id. at 89. The Dutton opinion also noted that the consideration of the trustworthiness of evidenciary hearsay is interwoven with confrontation considerations. In fact,
the Court stated that "[T)he Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evideniary hearsay rule stem from the same roots." Id. at 86.
57. See, United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059
(1981); United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1977).
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accused.&8 Other circuits however, have considered the admission
of inculpatory statements in cases where there was sufficient corroboration of those statements,69 but have often excluded them
because of their unreliability. so The decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. White,8} permitted admission of a statement against penal interest inculpating the accused but the
court omitted most of the material which inculpated the
defendant. 82
D.

The Right to Confrontation

The U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to confront the witness against him.8s The Supreme Court
in Pointer v. State of Texas,s4 held that the right of an accused
to confront the witness is a fundamental one and that cross-examination in a criminal case is included therein. The defendant
in Pointer contested the admission of the preliminary hearing
transcript of an unavailable witness. The Court excluded the
testimony because the defendant was not represented at the earlier hearing and therefore was unable to effectively exercise his
58. 720 F.2d at 558-59.
59. See, United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir. 1978).
60. In Alvarez, the declarant's inculpatory statement was testified to by a third person and was found to be unreliable because it was made to a detective when the declarant was in custody. Bailey involved a statement made by an incarcerated witness who
plea bargained in exchange for testimony inculpating his co-defendant. He later opted
not to testify and the court refused to admit the statements, finding them unreliable.
Other court decisions considering the issue have involved a testifying witness who was
unable to recall prior inculpatory statements at trial. United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d
123 (3rd Cir. 1981); United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 926 (1980). See also, United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1981) (statement of unlocatable witness not admissible because corroborative circumstances did not
indicate the statement was trustworthy); United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir.
1979) (statement of unavailable witness made to an F.B.I. agent was not sufficiently
reliable).
61. 553 F.2d 310 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977). The court ruled the
inculpative statements of a young prostitute could be admitted against the defendant
and any error in their admission was harmless. Id. at 314.
62. Id. In its opinion the court noted the suggestion of a commentator that the
problems with reliability and the prejudice against an accused, should almost always result in the exclusion of inculpatory hearsay offered against the defendant. Id. at 314.
63. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
64. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The complaining witness in Pointer was no longer in the
jurisdiction but the testimony from the preliminary hearing was introduced over the defendant's objection. The Court's focus was on the defendant's right to cross-examine the
witness as part and parcel of fair trial considerations. Id.
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right to cross-examine the witness. 66 Similarly, the Court in
Bruton v. United States,66 held the confessions of a declarant
which inculpated the defendant could not be admitted into evidence absent cross-examination of the declarant who did not
take the stand. 67
In a plurality opinion, the Court in Dutton v. Evans,68 focused its attention on the reliability of the' testimony rather
than confrontation of the witness, and admitted hearsay testimony without cross-examination of the declarant. 69 The Court
indicated the purposes of the confrontation clause was to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth determining process in criminal trials. 70 The plurality opinion also recognized it could not be argued that the constitutional right to
confrontation required exclusion of all hearsay testimony.71 Although the evidence examined in Dutton was not considered to
be "crucial or devastating,"72 the Court outlined four factors to
be considered in measuring the reliability of the declarant's
statement: (1) whether the declaration contains assertions of
past fact which might lead the jury to give it undue weight; (2)
whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity
65. [d. at 403-04. The Court emphasized the defendant had not had adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and hence admission of the transcript would have
been a clear denial of the right to confrontation. [d.
66. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The defendant had been convicted at a joint trial and his
co-defendant's confession had been admitted against him by the trial court with instructions to the jury that they use it in their deliberations. [d.
67. In Bruton, a postal inspector to whom the confession was made, testified to its
content. The Court held that the jury, although instructed no.t to consider the confession
on the issue of guilt, would look at the incriminating nature of the confession. Since the
co-defendant would not take the stand, there was no opportunity for cross-examination
of the source of the confession. [d. at 126. In the cases decided prior to Dutton the Court
was concerned with the continued vitality of sixth amendment guarantees to confront
the witness. This is opposed to the approach in Dutton which emphasizes the reliability
of the hearsay testimony. See also, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Ohio v.
Roberts, 338 U.S. 56 (1980).
68. 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). See supra note 55. Only four justices concurred in the
Dutton opinion. 400 U.S. at 76. One of the justices concurred in the result of the case but
not with the means by which it was achieved. [d. at 93. The dissentors argued the testimony should not have been admitted absent cross-examination of the declarant and
stated that "[a)lthough Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion concludes that there was no violation of Evans' right of confrontation, it does so in the complete absence of authority of
reasoning to explain that result." [d. at 104-05.
69. [d.
70. [d. at 89.
71. [d. at 80.

72. [d. at 87.
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and role of the participants in the crime; (3) whether it was possible the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection; and (4)
whether the circumstances might indicate the declarant misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime. 73
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Adams,74 stated that
a violation of the confrontation clause could be determined by
considering whether the unavailability of the declarant deprived
the jury of a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out
of court statements. In Perez, the court stated that the confrontation clause analysis should proceed on an ad-hoc basis, testing
both the necessity and the reliability of the contested testimony.71i The court utilized the Dutton test to determine the reliability of the statements and emphasized that finding the statement admissible under the coconspirator exception to the
hearsay rule did not automatically guarantee compliance with
the confrontation clause. 76 In its ruling the court stated that admissibility under a hearsay exception did not a fortiori dissolve
the court's obligation to review the record for constitutional
infirmity.77
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Layton, the court was faced with two jurisdictional questions of first impression: (1) whether the district court could rule
on a government motion to admit evidence prior to rather than
during the retrial of a defendant; and, (2) whether appellate review of the lower court's order excluding the evidence was
73. [d. at 88-89. The facts in Dutton indicate the declarant was unwilling to testify
against the defendant and therefore was unavailable as a witness. Under the provisions
of Fed. R. Evid. 804(a), a witness is unavailable if: (1) exempt from testimony on the
ground of privilege, or (2) refuses to testify despite a court order to do so, or (3) the
witness testifies to a lack of memory, or (4) dead or physically infirmed, or (5) the proponent of the testimony has been unable to procure attendance of the witness by process or
other reasonable means. In Dutton, the declarant's testimony was testified to by a prison
informant and the opportunity to cross-examine the informant was exercised. 400 U.S. at
89. Also significant in the case was the fact that 20 witnesses, including an eyewitness,
testified for the prosecution and were cross-examined by defendant's counsel. [d. at 87.
74. 446 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
75. 658 F.2d at 660.
76. [d. at 660. See also, United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976) (even though sufficient evidence to satisfy foundational
requirements of co-conspirator exception, separate consideration of the confrontation issue is required).

77. 658 F.2d at 660.
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within the jurisdiction of the court.
The bulk of the court's decision however, was dedicated to
the review of the trial court's decision to exclude various hearsay
statements at the retrial of the defendant. In its three part holding the court determined: (1) the trial court's decision to hear an
evidentiary motion before trial would be reversed only if the
court had abused its discretion; (2) appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of the government's pretrial evidentiary motion
was available by statute; and, (3) the various hearsay statements
offered against the defendant were admissible as statements either in furtherance of a conspiracy or as declarations against penal interest, and the statements were sufficiently reliable to circumvent constitutional concerns. 78
In analyzing the jurisdictional questions the court found the
trial court appropriately balanced the factors which must be
considered7s before ruling on a pretrial evidentiary motion.
Since the government and the defense planned to use the same
evidence at the second trial, the court found it not to be an
abuse of discretion that the trial court ruled on the motion prior
to the retrial of the defendant. 80 Further, jurisdiction to review
the trial court's order excluding the contested statements was
found under 18 U.S.C. §3731. Citing Wilson,81 the court stated
that the purpose of the statute was to permit government appeals whenever the Constitution would permit. 82 The court also
found that the defendant's constitutional protection against
double jeopardy had not been violated, because the first trial
had ended in a hung jury and therefore the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 8S
Next, the court analyzed the evidentiary questions and
ruled that three of the four groups of contested statements84
were admissible as hearsay exceptions. The court determined
78. 720 F.2d at 553-55.
79. The lower court emphasized that since the evidence had been heard at the first
trial, little or no review would be required in rendering a decision before the second trial.
549 F. Supp. at 907. See also supra note 6.
80. 720 F.2d at 553.
81. [d. at 554.
82. [d.
83. [d.
84. See supra note 14.
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the statements in the recordings made prior to Ryan's arrival
might be admissible under the co-conspirator hearsay exception 81i after consideration by the lower court on remand, and
found the statements made by Jones to his attorney as well as
those recorded on the "Last Hour Tape" could be admitted as
declarations against Jones' penal interest. 86
With respect to the pre-arrival tapes, the court was in
agreement with the district court's findings that sufficient independent evidence was available to support a prima facie case of
a conspiracy to kill Congressman Ryan. 87 However, whether Jim
Jones was a member of that conspiracy was a question left for
determination on remand. 88 The court nonetheless proceeded to
analyze the statements made by Jones 89 and instructed that if
the lower court found Jones to be a member of the conspiracy on
remand, his statements would be admissible against the defendant as statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.9o The
court reasoned that Jones' statements were more than casual admissions or narrative declarations because they were expressions
of future criminal intent. 91
The court also noted that the broadcasts were intended to
enlist the crowd into compliance with a plan to kill Ryan, and to
bolster those who might have agreed to help.92 The court found
this to be further evidence of a pre-existing plan, and that the
speeches were made in furtherance of that plan. 93 Since the trial
court had not raised the confrontation issue with respect to
these statements, the court found it unnecessary to raise the
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
87. 720 F.2d at 554. The court noted the trial court had correctly based its ruling on
the planned and coordinated events at the airstrip, defendant's near simultaneous gunfire after other Temple members fired on the Ryan party, the defendant's involvement in
a discussion with Jim Jones before the Ryan group had left for the airstrip, the defendant's feigned defection, defendant's discussion with another Temple member on the
way to the airstrip, and the fact that defendant somehow obtained a weapon from another Temple member after being searched at the airstrip. Id. at 554.
88. Id. at 558.
89. [d. at 557.
90. [d. at 558.
91. [d. at 557.
92. Id.
93. Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 8

126

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:113

matter on appea1. 94
Next, the court found Jones' statements to his attorney and
those on the "Last Hour Tape" to be admissible as declarations
against Jones' penal interest. Recognizing that the statements
made by Jones to his attorney were offered to inculpate the accused, the court believed application of the penal interest exception to the hearsay rule was appropriate. Noting that other circuits had analyzed the issue, the court followed that authority.911
The court also determined the requirements of the penal interest exception to the hearsay rule as applied to exculpatory statements had been met.98 However, the court did not determine
what standard of trustworthiness should be utilized when evidence is offered to inculpate a defendant and expressed no view
as to the requisite corroboration. 9? According to the court, Jones
had no incentive to shift the blame to other Temple members
nor to divert guilt from himself, and since he had control over
events at the encampment, he would have known the acts of his
followers would be attributed to him. The court also believed
that since the statements were made by Jones to his attorney,
there were inherent guarantees of their reliability.
Concerning the "Last Hour Tape", the court found the
statements to be declarations against penal interest. 98 Unlike the
statements to Jones' attorney which did not clearly indicate
Jones' involvement, the tape amounted to an admission of criminalliability for the killings.99 However, the court disagreed with
the trial court's conclusion that admission of these statements
would violate the confrontation clause. loo
The court analyzed the confrontation issue with respect to
the "Last Hour Tape" and the statements made to Jones' attor94. Id. at 558. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
95. 720 F.2d at 558.
96. Id. at 559.
97. Id. Instead, the court stated the declarations were against Jones penal interest
and trustworthy for the same reason; his knowledge of the events that were about to take
.
place at the airstrip. Id. at 560.
98. Id. at 562-63. The trial court had made a similar ruling but excluded the statements on confrontation grounds. 549 F.Supp. at 914.
99.Id.
100. 720 F.2d at 562-63.
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ney by referring to the reliability analysis in Dutton. lOl The
court determined admission of Jones' statements to his attorney
would not violate the defendant's right to confront the witness
because: (1) the remarks were reliable insofar as they indicated
Jones' awareness of and cooperation with the events at the airstrip, (2) they were corroborated by the killings, and (3) the
statements were against Jones' penal interest. l02 Applying the
two part necessity and reliability approach used in Perez, the
court found that the necessity prong was met because Jones was
dead, and emphasized the reliability prong was supported by the
degree of corroboration and the fact that it was against Jones'
penal interest to make the statement. 103
Finally, with regard to the "Last Hour Tape", the court
found that under Dutton, the statements were not so inherently.
untrustworthy that they should have been excluded at the first
trial. The court states that Jones' statements on the tapes indicated he had detailed personal knowledge of the events that
were about to occur. The court also noted that there was little
likelihood that Jones' memory was faulty because of the close
temporal proximity of his statements to the events. l04 Also significant to the finding that the statements were admissible was
the court's opinion that any dangers which might be involved in
admitting the tape recorded statements without the opportunity
for cross-examination would be mitigated by the jury's position
to judge Jones' mental condition from the recordings
themselves. 1011

IV. CRITIQUE
The Ninth Circuit's near methodical approach in Layton
reaches an end not within the means of applicable law. The
holdings may have the effect of extending prosecutorial boundaries while narrowing sixth amendment protections l06 in criminal
101. Id. at 561.
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. Id. at 562.
105. Id. at 562-63. The trial court had excluded the evidence because it was impossi-

ble to tell what Jones meant from the tape recordings because of his agitated state of
mind. 549 F.Supp. at 914.
106. See, Keller, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159 (1983); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1185; Vaughn & Weaver, Interplay of the Confrontation Clause and the
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cases. The court also fails to recognize the practical and legal
implications of its decision.
For example, while the court's holdings on the jurisdictional
issues appear sound in light of Wilson, the court neglects to caution against routine evidentiary appeals by the government. The
court relied on Wilson as authority to disregard the language of
§3731 and emphasized that the right to appeal under the statute
could be exercised provided the appeal did not conflict with the
Constitution. The constitutional concern to not put the defendant in jeopardy is recognized, but another point is overlooked.
Permitting an immediate appeal of a government pretrial motion to admit evidence could result in the routine filing of pretrial motions of this sort. When it ruled on the government's
motion prior to defendant's retrial, the lower court stated that it
discouraged the filing and appeal of pretrial evidentiary motions
by the government because it could cause great delay and mischief in the judiciary.lo7 In complex cases such as Layton, a second trial can be significantly delayed while an interlocutory order is appealed to a higher court. As a matter of judicial
expedience, the government should be required to comply with
the statute by filing a timely appeal when evidence is initially
excluded and should not be given a windfall when it files its own
motion to admit the same evidence. lo8
In the analysis of the conspiracy issue, the court noted that
the district court had not clearly indicated at what point the
conspiracy to kill Ryan came into existence}09 However, the
court reviewed all of the statement~ made by Jones and ruled
that if on remand the district court found there was enough evidence to support a "reasonable inference" that the defendant
and Jones were members of the same conspiracy to kill Ryan,
the statements were to be admitted. llo
The ruling is problematic in that the circumstances under
which Jones made the statements are atypical of the cases relied
Hearsay Rule, 29 ARK. L.

REV. 375 (1975).
107. 549 F.Supp. at 908.
108. The lower court pointed out that other jurisdictions which permit interlocutory
appeals have had difficulty securing for criminal defendants the right to speedy trial. [d.
109. 720 F.2d at 558.
110. [d.
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on by the court in Layton. The authority cited by the court1l1
involved fact situations where the statements were made between identifiable co-conspirators or made to identifiable third
persons. The speeches made by Jones were not earmarked for
the defendant, but were broadcast over loudspeakers to all of
the Jonestown residents. If they are to be admitted at defendant's retrial it must be presumed that either he heard and acquiesced in what Jones said, or that Jones intended to enlist the
help of his supporters to further a conspiracy to kill Ryan. It is
also quite possible that the conspiracy to kill Ryan arose without
the influence of Jones. Here, it is not clear when the conspiracy
to kill Ryan arose, and evidence to link the defendant to a plan
which also included Jones is not substantial.
Another problem with this aspect of the opInion is the
court's reliance on the hearsay statements themselves to suggest
there was a "reasonable inference" to support a single conspiracy theory. Such reliance is clearly prohibited by Perez and the
federal rules which require independent proof of the existence of
a conspiracy. Lower courts in future conspiracy cases should be
cautious in finding inferences of conspiracy when independent
facts to support such a finding are not present.
A particularly troublesome aspect of the court's analysis is
the ruling that the statements made by Jones to his attorney not
only qualified as declarations against penal interest, but also
could be offered as evidence to inculpate the defendant. In so
ruling, the court stretches the penal interest hearsay exception
beyond its traditional bounds.l12 The initial difficulty is the
court finding the statements were inculpative in light of their
content. The remarks did not inculpate Jones nor did they indicate that he was responsible for the imminent violence at the
airstrip. Instead, the statements were directed toward the defendant's alleged role in the events which later took Ryan's life. It
would seem likely that Jones would inform a trusted person, in
this case his attorney, that someone else intended to kill Ryan in
order not to implicate himself in any wrongdoing. In light of the
fact that the statements were not entirely accurate, and since
111. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 53 and 54 for the language of Rule 804(b)(3) and comments
regarding its application.
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the defendant cannot impeach an unavailable witness, the
court's decision undermines the concern that evidence under
this hearsay exception be trustworthy.
A second problem with the ruling in Layton is the dangerous precedent which the court establishes. The court fails to
mention that in the circuit cases relied on for authority, the
statements were excluded in whole or in part because they were
not trustworthy. While it can be recognized that there may be
instances which might provide a valid argument for the admission of inculpative statements under the penal interest exception
to the hearsay rule, the facts in Layton do not lend themselves
to set a trend for the lower courts.
Finally, in permitting the admission of the three groups of
hearsay statements notwithstanding the provisions of the confrontation clause, the court limits sixth amendment protections
and ignores the Supreme Court decisions 1l3 which focus on
cross-examination as the touchstone of the confrontation issue.
In Layton, the court ruled that the contested hearsay statements could be admitted under the reliability analysis suggested
in Dutton. The difficulty with that approach is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that Dutton was a plurality opinion which
did not clearly address the sixth amendment issues. Therefore,
its precedential value is questionable.
While relying on Dutton, the Ninth Circuit ignored the language in that case as well as its earlier holding in Perez when it
failed to address the confrontation issue 1l4 respecting the coconspirator statements. As Perez required that the record be reviewed for constitutional infirmity, lUi the Supreme Court in
Dutton made it clear that it must be demonstrated that admission of the statement will not violate the confrontation clause.
The explanation for the court's failure to consider that issue
may lie in the lower court's failure to consider the issue. However, that explanation is insufficient given the fact that the lower
court excluded the evidence on other grounds and had no reason
to address the confrontation issue. Since admission of the taped
speeches is critical in finding a conspiracy to which Jones and
113. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See supra notes 64 and 66.
114. 720 F.2d at 558.
115. 658 F.2d at 660.
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the defendant were connected, the court should have addressed
the issue to determine whether the provisions of the sixth
amendment were satisfied.
In relying on the plurality OpInIOn in Dutton, the court
completely ignores the Supreme Court's previous holdings 1l6
which dealt with the confrontation issue. Significantly, the court
fails to consider Pointer and Bruton in its analysis. These are
cases which fall into a line of authority that reveal the approach
relied on by the Court in deciding cases arising under the confrontation clause. The approach focuses on cross-examination as
a requirement for confrontation. 1l7 Such a focus is appropriate
given the critical nature of the facts in Layton.
The Dutton case involved the confrontation of a witness
testifying to non-critical statements of the declarant. An abundance of independent evidence was available to the prosecution
to help obtain a conviction in that case. The Ninth Circuit's reliance on the case is an unwise expansion of a dubious plurality
approach. The evidence in question in Layton is critical to the
case and the degree of independent evidence to connect Jones
and Layton to the same conspiracy is certainly questionable.
Equally significant is the actual content of the hearsay
statements at issue in the Layton case. Since they are critical in
determining the intent of the declarant Jim Jones, his state of
mind at the time he made the speeches and the remarks to his
attorney is particularly relevant. Again, Dutton affords little
help on this point. In that case the state of mind of the declarant proved to be insignificant. Further, the defendant was at
least able to avail himself of the opportunity to cross-examine
the witness testifying to the statement alleged to inculpate him.
Under those circumstances the jury was at least able to reach a
conclusion as to the weight to be given the testimony of the witness, a prison informant, in light of the considerable evidence
which had been offered by the prosecution.
The facts in Layton support a "cross-examination" analysis
of the confrontation issue as set forth in Pointer and Bruton. To
116. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See supra notes 64 and 66.
117. See text accompanying note 67.
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suggest that there is sufficient independent evidence to justify
the admission of the statements without raising a confrontation
problem simply is not supported by the facts of the case. The
court's suggestion that Jones' state of mind at the time he made
the speeches will be obvious from the recordings themselves is
an untenable proposition. While the arguments for admitting
the various statements under exceptions to the hearsay rule is
readily apparent, the confrontation problems which are inherent
in this case do not favor the admission of the tape recorded
statements offered against the defendant.

v.

CONCLUSION

The events which took place at the airstrip near Jonestown,
Guyana in 1978 are ineligbly stamped into the minds of many.
These events indicate there was some evidence pointing to a
conspiracy to kill Congressman Leo Ryan. However, evidence of
when that conspiracy arose and the actors involved is unclear.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion demonstrates the court's willingness to ensure that there is accountability for the murder.
However, the opinion is dangerous because it provides a standard by which established rules of evidence and appellate procedure are stretched to their limits. This precedent could lead to
convictions based on inculpatory statements absent confrontation of the declarant and may result in the admission of less
than reliable evidence in criminal trials. The court in effect extends prosecutorial boundaries in its broad interpretation of the
appeals statute and the applicable rules of evidence. The cursory
analysis of the confrontation clause question reflects a limitation
on the assertion of sixth amendment protections.

Samuel Santistevan·

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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I.

v. RUBIO: NINTH CIRCUIT SETS HIGH
STANDARD OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
SEARCH WARRANTS UNDER RICO

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Rubio,l the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that in the absence of a showing by the government
that an association is wholly unlawful, the affidavit supporting
the warrant to search the premises of that organization must
provide probable cause to believe the people associated with the
organization had conducted its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.2
Defendant Manuel Frank Rubio was convicted of violating
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, more
commonly referred to as RICO,s for conspiring to participate in
the conduct of the affairs of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club.
On June 13, 1979 a grand jury returned a three count indictment
charging thirty-three defendants with various violations of the
RICO statute.· Rubio was one of the named defendants. 1I
. Searches of defendant's premises had been made pursuant
to indicia warrants under RICO which authorized the search and
seizure of articles showing membership in, or association with,
an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.
Through the use of indicia warrants, authorities not only found
evidence of membership and association with the Hell's Angels,
1. 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Anderson, J; Takasugi, District J. sitting by
designation; Poole, J. dissenting)
2. [d. at 794.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. (1976).
4. The grand jury had determined that the Hell's Angels Motocycle Club was an
enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity and therefore in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1961(a), (c) and (d), 727 F.2d at 790.
5: There were five other defendants (Elledge, Smith, Palomar, Passaro and Stefanson) who appealed their convictions of various firearms and narcotics violations. Rubio
appealed his conviction under RICO. The six cases were consolidated for trial and appeal. [d.
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but were also able to seize substantial amounts of evidence of
criminal activity not covered by the indictment. 6
At trial, the court concluded that the indicia warrants were
valid under the fourth amendment, because a nexus existed between the items sought and the alleged criminal activity.' Defendants appealed and contended that there was no such nexus. 6
II.

BACKGROUND

RICO was enacted for the purpose of protecting legitimate
business from the infiltration of organized crime. 9 RICO's four
6. [d.
7. [d. at 793.
8. [d. at 792. Part III of the majority opinion dealt with various issues raised by

defendant Smith. Because he had consented to a search of his premises and firearms
were found in plain view, the court found all of his objections to be without merit. His
conviction was affirmed. [d. at 799.
9. Section 1 of Act (Oct. 15, 1970, P.L. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941; Nov.
2, 1978, P.L. 95-575, § 3(c), 92 Stat. 2465); provided:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United
States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread
activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and
fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social
exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used
to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions
and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence
gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the
legally admissable evidence necessary to bring criminal and
other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions
and remedies available to the government are unnecessarily
limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal
tools in the evidence gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those en-
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criminal prohibitions are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The Section prohibits: (1) the acquisition of legitimate business with illegally derived funds;lo (2) any person from illegally acquiring,
maintaining an interest in or controlling any enterprise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce;ll (3) provides that any employee
or any person associated with an enterprise who conducts or
participates in illegal conduct of the enterprise such as racketeering or collection of an unlawful debt l2 has violated this section;13 and (4) declares that it is illegal for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions stated above. 14
To obtain a conviction under RICO the government must
prove that an enterprise exists and that it was engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. I II An enterprise includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity
and any union or group of individuals associated for an illegal
purpose. IS A pattern of racketeering activity requires at least
gaged in organized crime.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) provides in part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt. . .
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which engages in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a
pattern of racketeering activity or through col1ection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976) defines "unlawful debt" as a debt "(A) incurred or
contracted in gambling activity ... and (B) ... incurred in connection with the business of gambling activity in violation of the law ... "
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections(a), (b), or (c) of this section."
15. U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976) defines "enterprise" to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
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two acts of racketeering activity within a ten year period. 17
In United States v. Turkette,I8 the Supreme Court held
that the term enterprise as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate organizations. IS In Turkette, defendant 20 formed an association for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics, committing arsons, defrauding insurance
companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police officers
and attempting to influence the outcome of state court proceedings.21 On appeal the defendant argued that RICO was only intended to protect legitimate business from infiltration by organized crime and that RICO did not encompass organizations
which only performed illegal acts when they had made no attempt to infiltrate legitimate business. 22 The First Circuit
agreed; 23 but was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court
stated that RICO should be interpreted to cover both legitimate
and illegitimate enterprises 24 and found nothing in the statute's
legislative history requiring a different conclusion. 211
RICO has been challenged on many grounds. The First
Amendment guarantee of free association recognized by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson 28 and
Bates v.' City of Little Rock,27 is one such challenge. In both
cases the Supreme Court held that compelled disclosure of
membership in an organization absent sufficient justification, violated the constitutional guarantees of privacy in group association and freedom of association. 28
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) states: "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter [enacted October 15, 1970) and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) of the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity. "
18. 452 U.S. at 576.
19. [d. at 580-81.
20. Defendant Turkette was convicted after a six week trial on the RICO conspiracy
count, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and was sentenced to a 20 year term and fined $20,000. [d. at
579.
21. [d.
22. [d. at 579-80.
23. 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1981).
24. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
25. [d. at 591.
26. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
27. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
28. 357 U.S. at 462; 361 U.S. at 523. The Court stated: "In the domain of these
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In another constitutional challenge, in United States u.
Giese/· 9 it was alleged that admission of certain evidence infringed first amendment liberties of freedom of expression and
the right to receive information. 30 The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument, however, and held that although evidence of association may not establish a conspiracy it has sufficient probative value to be admissable. 31
Similarly, in United States u. Martino,32 a group who associated for the purpose of committing arson with the intent to
defraud fire insurers was convicted under RICO.33 On appeal defendants alleged that RICO was unconstitutional because it punished associational status. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and stated that RICO's prescriptions are directed against
conduct, not status. 34
RICO has also been challenged on fourth and fourteenth
amendment grounds. In Zurcher u. Stanford Daily,31i the Ninth
Circuit held that the fourth and fourteenth amendments forbade
the issuance of a warrant to search for materials in possession of
one not suspected of crime unless the affidavit supporting the
warrant gave probable cause to believe that a subpoena duces
tecum would be impracticable. 3e The Supreme Court however,
rejected this test and reversed stating that the critical element
was not whose possession was involved but whether there was
reasonable cause to believe that the things to be seized might be
indispensible liberties, whether of speech, press or association, the decisions of this Court
recognize that the abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably
follow from varied forms of governmental action. 357 U.S. at 461. Therefore, the court
held "that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association
[NAACP) claims on behalf of its members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing [comes) within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 466.
29. 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
30. 597 F.2d at 1185. In that case defendant was associated with an anti-war group
responsible for several bombings of United States Armed Forces Recruiting Centers. To
show association the government introduced a book entitled From the Movement Toward Revolution on which were found Giese's fingerprints and those of several other
defendants. Id.
31. Id. at 1187.
32. 648 F.2d 367, (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982).
33. 648 F.2d at 379.
34. Id. at 380.
35. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
36. 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
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found on the searched premises. 37 The Court then held that a
search warrant may issue for items in the possession of a third
party who is not suspected of a crime. 38
The fourth amendment requires that no warrants shall issue
except upon a showing of probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation. Prior to 1967 mere evidence, which is evidence
seized for the purpose of proving the government's case, was inadmissable at trial. Under the reasoning of Gouled u. United
States,39 the fourth amendment only allowed the seizure of instrumentalities, fruits of crime or contraband. 40
In Warden u. Hayden,41 the Court reversed this long standing rule and stated that nothing in the language of the fourth
amendment supported the distinction between mere evidence
and instrumentalities, fruits of crime or contraband. 42 The Supreme Court reasoned that privacy is not disturbed any more by
a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a
search directed to an instrumentality, fruit or contraband!3 Because a magistrate can intervene in both situations, the fourth
amendment requirements of probable cause and specificity are
not threatened. The Court went on to conclude that there must
be a nexus between the item to be seized and criminal behavior." In the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband, the
nexus is automatically provided. In the case of mere evidence,
probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe
that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or
conviction. 411
In Illinois u. Gates,46 the Supreme Court changed the appellate standard for reviewing magistrates' findings of probable
cause with respect to anonymous informants' tips and imple37. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565.
38. [d.

39. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
40. [d. at 310-11. (Papers seized only for evidentiary value not specifically described
on the warrant affidavit were held to be taken in violation of defendant's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.) [d. at 311.
41. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
42. [d. at 301-02.
43. [d.
44. [d. at 307.
45. [d.
46. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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mented a new probable cause standard.· 7 The court held that
although veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all
highly relevant in evaluating an informant's tip, these elements
are not dispositive. Rather, they should be viewed as intertwined
issues which may illuminate whether there was probable cause
to believe that contraband or evidence was located in a particular place. 48 The Court noted that so long as the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the appellate court may only reverse if it can find no substantial basis for the magistrate's
decision. 49
In United States v. Brooklier,IIO defendants were convicted
of violating RICO and the Hobbs Act. 1I1 Defendants were members of La Cosa Nostra, a secret national organization engaged
in a wide range of racketeering activities. 1I2 Defendants claimed
47. Id. at 2325.
48. Id. Justice Rehnquist labelled this approach the totality of the circumstances
test. Id. at 2328.
49. Id. at 2332. Prior to Gates the Ninth Circuit had held that it was a question of
law for the appellate court to determine whether probable cause existed at the time the
magistrate issued the indicia warrant. United States u. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1359
(1982); however, in the Rubio case it is not clear whether or not the court has adopted
the Gates standard: "The Supreme Court in Gates applied a standard that would consider whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for his probable cause determination . . . . For purposes of this case, however, we are constrained to disagree with the
trial court regardless of which standard [Chesher (de nouo review) or Gates (substantial
basis)] applies." 727 F.2d at 793. The majority noted that the issue was currently before
the court in United States u. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The narrow issue
in that case was: what standard of review should the appellate court apply when a federal agent performs an improper search but was excused by exigent circumstances? The
court held that "the question of exigent circumstances is subject to de nouo review." Id.
at 1205. The court noted that "[q)uestions of fact are reviewed under the deferential,
clearly erroneous standard." Id. at 1200. Under the court's ad hoc approach "a number
of categories of suppression questions [will be] open to review under standards that will
have to be developed for each of the categories by the seperate weighing of the preponderance of facts or law in so-called mixed questions of law and fact." Id. at 1209. The
court did not discuss the applicability of Gates.
50. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 19'82).
51. Id. at 1213. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1948) provides that:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires to
do so or commits or threatens physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything
in violation of this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years or both.
52. The court stated La Cosa Nostra was responsible for acts of murder, extortion,
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that the indictment charging them with a RICO conspiracy was
fatally ambiguous. liS The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument
and stated that the essence of a RICO conspiracy is not an
agreement to commit racketeering acts, but an agreement to
conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering. 1I4 The court reasoned that conspiracies
or attempts can serve as racketeering activities because 18
U.S.C. § 1951 is applicable to conspiracies and attempts to obstruct, delay or impact commerce by robbery, extortion or physical violence.lIlI Therefore, even if a racketeering offense was not
completed, defendants had violated RICO.lIe
The Second Circuit affirmed two RICO convictions in
United States v. ScottO.1I7 Defendants alleged that the trial
judge should have instructed the jury that they were required to
find that the acts committed by them concerned or related to
the operation of a particular enterprise and its affairs through
its essential functions. liB The appellate court rejected this argument and stated that RICO requires only that the government
prove that the defendants' acts were committed in the conduct
of the union's affairs. 1I9 This burden could be fulfilled by showing
either (1) that one is enabled to commit RICO violations solely
by virtue of a position in the enterprise or involvement in or
control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) by showing that
the violations were related to the activities of that enterprise. eo
gambling and loan sharking. 685 F.2d at 1213.
53. 1d. at 1216. Defendants alleged that the racketeering activities set forth in
Count 1 of the indictment (conspiracy to commit RICO) amounted to an illogical and
ambiguous allegation.
54.1d.
55.1d.
56. 1d., See supra notes 10-14.
57. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. 1d. at 54. Defendants were president and vice-president of the Local 1814 of the
International Longshoreman's Union. 1d. at 50.
59. [d. at 54.
60. 1d. Since the government fulfilled its burden of proof on both counts appellant's
argument was dismissed. The Second Circuit also quoted the following language:
Section 1962(c) nowhere requires proof regarding the advancement of the union's affairs by the defendant's activities,
or proof that the union itself is corrupt, or proof that the
union authorized defendant to do whatever acts form the basis
for the charge. It requires only that the government establish
that the defendant's acta were committed in the conduct of
the union's affairs.
1d., quoting United States v. Field, 432 F.Supp. 55, 58 (S.D. N.Y. 1977), aft'd, 578 F.2d
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Finally, RICO has been challenged on the issue of whether a
grand jury indictment is sufficient to establish probable cause to
search. In United States u. Ellsworth,S1 defendant claimed that
the affidavits supporting the search warrant did not set forth
facts that would lead a neutral and detached magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed to believe that he had committed an assault.62 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,S3 stating that
sworn affidavits by eye witnesses describing Ellsworth and his
clothing coupled with an indictment, supported the magistrate's
finding of probable cause. s• The Ninth Circuit noted that the
magistrate has the same right as the court to take judicial notice
of the indictment. sli However, the Ninth Circuit stated that it
was not persuaded by the government's argument that a magistrate can base a probable cause decision to search solely on a
previous indictment. ss It reasoned that because a grand jury's
spectrum of responsibility does not include the duty of determining probable cause to search, an indictment alone would not
constitute sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. S7
III.

ANAL YSIS

A.

The Majority

The court first determined whether the search for items
containing the identities of Hell's Angels members, other than
those indicted, violated the right to freedom of association. s8 Answering in the negative the court reasoned that although there is
a potential for abuse in using an indicia warrant, a narrowly
drawn and properly issued and executed warrant does not vio1371 (2d Cir. 1978),cert.denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
61. 647 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 963.
63. Id. at 964.
64.Id.
65. Id. at 963. See United States v. Sevier, 539 F.2d 599,603 (6th Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 964.
67. Id., In general the Ninth Circuit has given prosecutors broad leeway in filing
RICO complaints.
See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877(9th Cir. 1981). In prosecution for
RICO violation, government is not precluded from using same evidence to establish both
element of enterprise and element of pattern of racketeering; see United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1220-22. In prosecution for violating RICO, uncorroborated testimony of
accomplice is sufficient to support convictions so long as it is not incredible or unsubstantial on its face. See United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1978).
68. 727 F.2d at 791.
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late a RICO suspect's first amendment rights. 69 The rights are
protected because the government is required to prove both that
the suspect was associated with an organization and that the organization was engaged in racketeering. 70
The Ninth Circuit agreed, however, with defendant's argument challenging the issuance of the warrants for lack of probable cause. The court stated that no nexus was established by the
government between the evidence seized and criminal activity.71
All of the items described in the search warrants were to be used
as evidence, by the government, to show association with a
RICO enterprise. Therefore, the court applied a two-part test.
First, the warrants were examined to determine whether there
was probable cause to believe a suspect was associated with a
particular enterprise. Next, the court held that absent a showing
that a large portion of a RICO enterprise's activities are illegitimate so that the entire enterprise, in effect, becomes wholly illegitimate, the warrants must be examined for probable cause to
believe that the suspect conducted the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.72
In applying its two-part standard to the search warrants
and their supporting affidavits in this case, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the warrants were issued without probable
cause. 73 Because none of the affidavits contained statements or
69. [d. at 792.
70. [d. The court stated:
"We agree with defendants that the First Amendment protects their right to associate with one another and with the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. We strongly disagree
with any inference that criminal investigation is somehow prohibited when it interferes
with such First Amendment interests."
[d. at 791.
71. [d. at 794.
72. [d. The court stated: "probable cause to believe a suspect was associated with a
particular enterprise would be insufficient of itself to support a warrant for the seizure of
indicia of association." [d. Therefore it held that unless the enterprise can be shown to
be "wholly illegitimate" the government must prove the suspect conducted the affairs of
the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The court went on to state:
"We believe a contrary rule could lead to the seizure of 'mere evidence' from any suspected member or associate of any enterprise with no nexus whatever between the evidence and criminal activity." [d. The court implied that such a rule would violate the
fourth amendment.
73. [d. at 794. The affidavit in part cited (1) forms of indicia customarily kept by
members and associates of the Hell's Angels; (2)facts tending to establish that each defendant was a member or associate of the Hell's Angels; and (3) that a federal grand jury
had returned an indictment which charged the named defendants with associating with a
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facts to believe that defendant had conducted the affairs of the
motorcycle club through a pattern of racketeering activity there
was no probable cause. 74 Additionally, since the facts stated in
the affidavits were limited to establishment of association with
the club, they were insufficient to provide the required nexus between defendant's association with the club and criminal
activity.711
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the trial court's holding
that because evidence of association would aid in a conviction
under the RICO counts, a nexus existed between the items
sought and the alleged criminal activity.76 Because the affidavit
did not allege that the motorcycle club's activities were wholly
illegitimate, it did not follow that evidence of association would
necessarily aid in obtaining a conviction. The court reasoned
that if the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to show
that an organization was wholly illegitimate, those people innocently associated with a legitimate enterprise being conducted
by others through a pattern of racketeering activity would forfeit their fourth amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 77
The court then stated that an affidavit's recitation of a
RICO indictment handed down by a grand jury was insufficient
to establish probable cause. 7S It reasoned that only a neutral and
detached magistrate can properly make the determination of
probable cause to search." Furthermore, the basis of the magistrate's probable cause determination must show from the face of
the warrant affidavit. so Since making determinations of probable
cause is beyond the scope of the grand jury's duties as set forth
in Ellsworth, an indictment alone cannot provide probable cause
to search. 81
RICO enterprise. [d.
74. [d.
75. [d.
76. [d. at 793.
77. [d.
78. [d. at 794.
79. [d. at 794-95., See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981).
80. See United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1978).
81. 727 F.2d at 795. (the function of the grand jury is to determine whether there is
sufficient probable cause to require an accused to stand trial before a petit jury).
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The majority also stated the affidavit gave no basis for believing that defendant had conducted the affairs of a RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Therefore,
the magistrate had no substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed82 because the magistrate's probable cause
determination was no more than a ratification of the conclusions
of a grand jury. Citing Ellsworth, the court noted that this was
an impermissable basis. 83 Furthermore, because fourth amendment privacy protection is highly vulnerable when evidence of
association with a RICO enterprise is sought, the affidavit supporting the search warrant most show both probable cause to
believe that the suspect was associated with a particular enterprise and that the suspect conducted its affairs by means of
racketeering. 8 • The court concluded that the affidavits did not
provide probable cause and the evidence discovered through the
search warrants should have been suppressed. 811
B.

The Dissent

The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
under RICO if a defendent is charged with associating with an
enterprise and participating in the conduct of its affairs through
a pattern of racketeering, a warrant cannot issue to search out
indicia of association unless the affidavits allege that the enterprise is wholly illega1. 88
It rejected the majority's interpretation of Warden v. Hayden, and argued that when evidence is sought by the government solely to prove its case at trial, probable cause should be
evaluated on the basis of whether or not the evidence sought will
aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. 87 Although such
evidence does not prove that a suspect is guilty, it can be used to
constitute a link in an evidentiary chain supporting a reasonable
belief that a certain suspect may have committed a particular
crime. 88
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

727 F.2d at 795.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 800.
[d. at 803.
727 F.2d at 803.
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The dissent also argued that the majority's two-part probable cause standard was based on two faulty premises. 89 First, if
the crime involved association, the affidavit must charge that the
organization was wholly illegal. Second, the affidavit cannot be
saved by references to an indictment because an indictment does
not give probable cause to search. 90 The dissent stated that with
respect to the first premise, the fourth amendment makes no requirement that a suspect's conduct or association be "wholly illegal" and furthermore that the criminal process is not equipped
to make such judgments. 91 Next, considering the validity of the
affidavits, the dissent concluded that the majority had erred in
rejecting them. 92 It argued that because the affidavits described
conduct which amounted to racketeering activity outlined in
RICO, and they set forth the basis of the affiant's knowledge,
the indictment did not stand alone as the basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause. 9S
The dissent next addressed the issue of whether an indictment constitutes probable cause to issue a search warrant. It disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Ellsworth and argued that because the magistrate was permitted to take judicial
notice of the indictment there was no reason to bar it from
consideration. 94
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's stance on exercising de novo review over lower court decisions of probable
89.Id.
90.Id.
91. Id. at 804. The dissent stated:
The Fourth Amendment requires specificity as to persons,
houses, papers and effects; and these requirements must be
made known to a judicial officer by oath or affirmation. Seldom can it be demonstrated that the ... prosecution is for
conduct wholly bad. That is a moral not a legal judgment, and
it is with the latter that the criminal process is equipped to
deal.
Id.
92. [d.
93. Id. at 805.
94. Id. The dissent distinguished Ellsworth on two grounds: first, it was not a RICO
case, and second, the search warrant was upheld because the indictment was supported
by eye-witness testimony. Id. at 804-05. In conclusion he stated: "The majority has overstated the opinion of Ellsworth and understated the probable cause significance of a
valid indictment." Id. at 805.
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cause. 911 It stated that Gates did apply to this case and that it
was dispositive. 96 Under Gates the magistrate's job in determining probable cause for a search warrant consisted of making a
practical, commonsense decision whether given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. 97 The dissent stated that on this basis the district court
was correct in handing a conviction of defendant. 98 Since the
duty of the appellate court under Gates is simply to ensure that
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed,99 the dissent stated that the majority's holding
was not mandated by the Fourth Amendment, did not comport
with current precedent and did not serve the sound administration of justice. loo
IV.

CRITIQUE

By implementing its two-part association-conduct probable
cause requirement for search warrants for legitimate and semilegitimate RICO enterprises the majority opinion vindicates the
fourth amendment right to privacy and the first amendment
right of freedom of association. However, the majority's new test
raises many uncertainties because of the difficulty in demonstrating that an organization's affairs are wholly illegitimate.
Law enforcement will now be required to prove association and
illegal conduct with reasonable certainty to the magistrate
before it is legally permitted to gather evidence. Additionally,
since grand jury indictments were held to be insufficient to give
probable cause to search,lol law enforcement authorities must
now show that the very persons whose premises were to be
searched had themselves conducted the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.
The dissent criticized the majority on the ground that it is
not the function of an affidavit to contain plenary allegations as
95. [d. at 808.
96. [d.

97. [d. See 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
98. 727 F.2d at 808-09.
99. [d. at 808.
100. [d. at 809.
101. [d. at 795.
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is the case in an indictment or information. l02 It stated that the
function of the affidavit is simply to show that probable cause
exists to believe that particular evidence used in a described
crime could probably be found in a certain location and that
that evidence could aid iIi convicting the suspect. l03 If the magistrate has this information he should issue the search warrant.
Under this reasoning, the majority's rule appears to be incorrect
because it adds unnecessary technicality to the warrant requirement. Also, by restricting the application of search warrants to
only people who have conducted the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering, the rule impedes the ability of
law enforcement authorities to combat organized crime.

In light of the Gates totality of the circumstances test for
determining probable cause, the majority's standard does not
appear to be sound. l04 The Supreme Court chose to replace the
reliability of informant-basis of knowledge test developed by the
appellate courts with a more pragmatic totality of the circumstances test. 1011 The rationale for this test is that it is difficult to
square the complex evidentiary rules developed by appellate
courts with common sense judgments of magistrates, who apply
standards less demanding than those used in formal legal proceedings. Furthermore, since the fourth amendment imposes a
strong preference for search warrants, courts should interpret affidavits in a common sense rather than a hypertechnical ma~ner.
Most important for the Court was the argument that the basic
function of any government is to provide for the security of the
individual and his property.lOe The Court stated that reversing
convictions because of technical flaws in a search warrant will
seriously impede the task of law enforcement. l07 The majority
failed to even consider this reasoning before developing its own
standard of probable cause. l08
102. Id. at 804.
103. [d.
104. See supra note 49.
105. 103 S.Ct. at 2331.
106. [d.

107. Id.
108. The dissent stated: "In reality, the majority's rationale simply is a construct
harking back to the comforting impedimentia of Aguilar and Spinelli and which accommodates a patent unease with the directions of Warden and the explicit holding of
Gates." 727 F.2d at 803.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

35

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 8

148 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:133

The majority's concern that search warrants issued under
RICO could threaten constitutional rights may be traced to the
increased breadth of RICO in the past few years. IOe Although the
original purpose of RICO was to protect legitimate business
from the infiltration of organized crime,l1O it has been used in an
increasing number of circumstances. l l l One reason for this may
be that a RICO enterprise has been construed by courts to encompass many different combinations of individuals or groups of
individuals. 112 The issue of what constitutes a RICO enterprise
has become particularly acute because Congress did not draft
RICO to encompass illegal enterprises. Since the statute does
not distinguish legal from illegal enterprises, courts have been
forced to determine the outlines of the illegal enterprise concept1l8 without any guidance from the statute's legislative
history.
In this context, the Ninth Circuit's two-part probable cause
standard can be viewed as a means of cutting back on RICO's
109. Congress seems to have invited broad judicial interpretations by stating that
RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes," Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91·452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
110. See supra note 9.
111. See United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (RICO
used against a Japanese corporation manufacturing electric cable). In United States v.
Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977) (RICO used against constables and employees of
the Allegheny County court system).
112. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978), where the court held that any informal, loosely organized, de facto association
engaged in criminal conduct could constitute a RICO enterprise; because the definition
of enterprise is so amorphous, it has been argued that the government need only estab·
lish a pattern or racketeering activity to obtain a conviction. See Tarlow, RICO: The
New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L.REV. 165, 202 (1980).
113. In Turkette the Supreme Court described a RICO enterprise as "a group of
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct"
and "an ongoing organization, formal or informal [in which) the various associates func·
tion as a continuing unit." 452 U.S. at 583. In United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996 (4th
Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982) the court held that an illegal enterprise
must have separate existence. Id. at 999; In United States v. De Rosa, 670 F.2d 889, 896
(9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit held that under Turkette association by defendants
over a long period of time and involvement in drug distribution constituted an illegal
enterprise. For other approaches see United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir.
1980); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982) (court required proof by the
government of three factors: (1) commonality of purpose; (2) continuity of both structure
and personality and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct from racketeering activity).
Id. at 665. For critique of Bledsoe see Note, United States v. Bledsoe: RICO· Limiting
The Enterprise, 16 CREIGHTON L.REV. 1006 (1983); for an excellent survey of cases con·
struing RICO after Turkette see Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 293, 324·40
(1983).
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breadth and of side-stepping the enterprise issue. However, the
problem of what constitutes a RICO enterprise still exists and
the court should have addressed the issue. By adding the wholly
illegitimate enterprise test the court adds another layer of complexity to the statute's interpretation. Since the court failed to
define illegal enterprise their test creates unnecessary confusion.
Because this issue was not resolved the viability of RICO prosecutions will become unpredictable and lower courts will be burdened with unworkable standards.

v.

CONCLUSION

The majority's decision will have a direct and adverse public impact. After a long and difficult trial 114 five out of six convictions were reversed because the affidavits to the warrants did
not measure up to the majority's standard of probable cause.
Since the evidence obtained through the search warrants was
suppressed, the prosecution will probably have to drop the case.
This results in frustration to law enforcement agencies and the
public pays for high investigation and court costs and no results.
This opinion will impair the use of RICO against organized
crime since the majority has failed to articulate a standard for
what constitutes a wholly illegal enterprise. Moreover, the
court's probable cause test is over-technical and will result in
less successful criminal RICO prosecutions against organized
crime.
Douglas Buchanan*

114. 727 F.2d at 800.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1986.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

37

